The formalistic reasoningĪpproved by the U.S. Inquiry to determine whether to apply intermediate scrutiny, Bostock’s Because equal-protection doctrine uses an anticlassification That LGBT classifications are necessarily sex classifications, and (2) a purelyĭiscrimination.
IĪrgue, however, that the opinion in fact relies on (1) a logical conclusion That the opinion only affects Title VII or statutes with similar language.
Textualism, those who seek to limit the impact of Bostock might suggest Presented the majority opinion as nothing more than a routine application of Of Bostock-that discrimination against LGBT persons is necessarily sexĭiscrimination-applies under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. This Note takes up those questions, arguing that the holding Of Bostock and to evaluate its impact on LGBT equality beyond Title VII- and in particular, under the Constitution. They thus furnish an opportunity to take stock
Significant for generating some of the first legal disputes over transgenderĮquality after Bostock. Transgender students’ access to sex-specific spaces in school. Rights to focus on transgender youth in particular, building on conflicts over The way they have shifted legal and political contestation over transgender Prohibiting transgender student-athletes from participating in sportsĬonsistent with their gender identity. 4 Such laws are the mostĮxtreme form of a new crop of state legislation targeting transgender minors, 5 which also includes laws 3 Less than one year after Bostock,Īrkansas became the first state to pass such a law. These were bans on gender-affirming healthcare for minors. Were debating bills whose purpose was to stop children from becoming like thoseĪdults. Clayton County, 2 fifteen state legislatures
Momentous decision protecting LGBT 1 adults from employment discrimination in Bostock v. In 2020, as the Supreme Court was preparing to hand down its Thoughtful suggestions greatly improved this Note. I would also like to thank the editors of the Yale Law Journal, whose Siegel for her encouragement and guidance as this project developed. These laws and policies, which rely on sex-based stereotypes in order to compel conformity with the state’s normative vision of sex roles, cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny.Īuthor. Refuting defenses of these laws and policies sounding in biology, the Note argues that they rely on sex stereotyping-especially the stereotype that transgender minors are merely confused-in order to steer minors into particular sex roles. The Note then locates the beginnings of these constitutional developments in litigation over laws and policies targeting transgender minors. Nonetheless, the Note explains how this development would shift rather than resolve constitutional conflict over LGBT and especially transgender equality, and it argues for the importance of sex-stereotyping arguments under intermediate scrutiny. Application of Bostock’s holding to the Equal Protection Clause would extend intermediate scrutiny to classifications on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, a significant constitutional development. Clayton County’s holding under Title VII-that anti-LGBT discrimination is sex discrimination-applies as well under the Equal Protection Clause.
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